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RECONFIGURING THE SPACE OF AGENCY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
PEGGY REYNOLDS* 
[T]hey that study natural philosophy, study in vain, except they begin at 
geometry; and such writers or disputers thereof, as are ignorant of geometry, 
do but make their readers and hearers lose their time. 
 - Thomas Hobbes1 
In their efforts to establish the true nature of being through reason alone, 
Enlightenment philosophers took as their model Euclid’s axiomatic system of 
geometry.2  They sought to extend the timeless perfection of its 
uncompromising logic from the natural register to the moral, as it is the “want 
of moral science”3 that, according to Hobbes, visits the greatest harm on 
humans.  The rationalization of the moral code, then, was an attempt to ground 
the regulation of social relations in natural law—or those logics and ratios by 
which God’s perfection was made manifest.4  Hobbes’s concept of the social 
contract, by which individuals willingly cede certain rights in exchange for the 
protection of a dispassionate, civil society, was his attempt to demonstrate how 
a moral science based on the logically accessible eternal truth of geometry 
might form the basis of a new social order.5  After undergoing some revisions 
by Locke and Rousseau, a version of Hobbes’s social contract was 
 
* I would like to thank john powell for his inspirational engagement with the issues discussed 
herein and for inviting me to participate in the Childress Lecture; Brian Rotman and Marie Cieri 
for their insightful editorial comments and continued support of my work; and my readers at the 
Saint Louis University Law Journal for their judicious and generous contributions to this article.  
Peggy Reynolds (B.A., Hunter College, Cognitive Science; M.A. , The Ohio State University, 
Comparative Studies) is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Comparative Studies at The 
Ohio State University. 
 1. THOMAS HOBBES, METAPHYSICAL WRITINGS: ELEMENTS OF PHILOSOPHY 
CONCERNING THE BODY 25 (Mary Whiton Calkins ed., 2d ed. 1974). 
 2. See THOMAS L. HANKINS, SCIENCE AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT 1–2 (1985) (explaining 
that the “Scientific Revolution” was a revolution in geometry). 
 3. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 13. 
 4. See J.B. Schneewind, Modern Moral Philosophy, in A COMPANION TO ETHICS 147 
(Peter Singer ed., 1993) (explaining that ancient Western philosophical thought about how to live 
focused on one’s relations with others and obedience to God). 
 5. See JEAN HAMPTON, HOBBES AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT TRADITION 1 (1986) 
(discussing Hobbes’s social contract concept). 
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incorporated into the foundations of the American system of jurisprudence.6  It 
offered guarantees of equal protection under the law, deemed essential at the 
time to the formation of a democratic state, and its legal framework has since 
proven flexible enough to adjust to changing social norms, such as the need to 
include individuals originally denied protection (slaves, women, 
corporations).7 
As with any institution or school of thought, however, American 
jurisprudence is not monolithic.  Dominated initially by formalists, or those 
who argue that legal decisions should be based on a logical analysis of original 
texts, the philosophy of law gradually shifted, around the end of the last 
century, towards a realist approach, an approach which emphasized the 
importance of considering the social and political context out of which cases 
arose.8  These two philosophical approaches are perhaps evenly matched at 
present, the pendulum of public opinion having swung back towards a more 
formalist approach in the last thirty years.9  Although their respective 
philosophies may differ markedly in their approach to questions involving 
interpretation of the law, both sides agree on at least one thing: the space of 
agency recognized by the law is reserved solely for humans.  In keeping with 
the humanist perspective of Enlightenment philosophy, they both recognize 
that it is humans, and humans alone, who are capable of willful activity, as the 
actions of all other entities are attributable either to physical properties (as in 
the case of mineral or vegetable matter); instinct (as in the case of animals); or 
to the conscious behaviors of the humans that comprise them (as in the case of 
“artificial persons” or corporations). 
Opposing camps in the humanities and sciences are perennially involved in 
a similar philosophical dispute.  They disagree on whether it is materialist 
(comparable to the formalist) or the discursive (comparable to the realist) 
analytical framework which best accounts for apparent causal relations (that is, 
those in the discursive camp argue that discourse is prior to and thus shapes 
 
 6. Elizabeth Wolgast, A World of Social Atoms, in APPLIED SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 226 (Elizabeth Smith & H. Gene Blocker eds., 1994). 
 7. See ERIK A. BRUUN & JAY CROSBY, OUR NATION’S ARCHIVE: THE HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES IN DOCUMENTS 398 (1999) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
equal protection of the laws to all persons, including freed slaves). 
 8. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 185–95 (1993) (discussing the emergence of the legal realism movement).  
Interestingly, this shift coincided with the introduction of alternative geometrical logics.  See id. 
at 185–86 (noting various skeptics and ideas that surfaced during the movement). 
 9. See Allen R. Kamp, Jurisprudence: A Beginner’s Simple and Practical Guide to 
Advanced and Complex Legal Theory 40 (Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1328386 (stating that while legal realism dominated the jurisprudential 
landscape between World War I and World War II, the revival of a formalist approach suggests 
that “no jurisprudential school is permanently out of fashion”). 
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material relations while materialists argue the opposite), but both sides agree 
on the passive nature of matter and on agency as the prerogative solely of 
humans.10 
But this sort of dualist philosophical construction is even more common 
than these brief examples might suggest, a point not lost on philosopher 
Richard J. Bernstein, who more generally defines the two sides of the 
dialectical debate as “Objectivism” and “Relativism.”11  Objectivists (or the 
materialists and formalists in the above examples, who might also be likened to 
Platonists) hold “that there is or must be some permanent, ahistorical matrix or 
framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of 
rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, or rightness.”12  Relativists (or 
the discursivists and realists above, who might be compared with Sophists), by 
contrast, deny the possibility of such an ahistorical matrix and argue “that in 
the final analysis all such concepts must be understood as relative to a specific 
conceptual scheme, theoretical framework, paradigm, form of life, society, or 
culture.”13  Despite his awareness of the long-running nature of this debate in 
various (predominantly Western) discourses, Bernstein is convinced that “a 
new pattern in the conversation concerning human rationality is now taking 
shape: the very framework, the unacknowledged assumptions and metaphors 
that have kept these debates alive are now being called into question.”14  
Political philosopher John Gray would agree with this analysis, but he appears 
to be far less sanguine about the possible outcome: 
Over the past two hundred years, philosophy has shaken off Christian faith.  
[However], [i]t has not given up Christianity’s cardinal error—the belief that 
humans are radically different from all other animals. . . .  We are persons, 
whose actions are the results of their choices.  Other animals pass their lives 
unawares, but we are conscious.  Our image of ourselves is formed from our 
ingrained belief that consciousness, selfhood and free will are what define us as 
human beings, and raise us above all other creatures. . . .  This is the creed of 
those who have given up an irrational belief in God for an irrational faith in 
mankind.  But what if we give up the empty hopes of Christianity and 
humanism?  Once we switch off the soundtrack—the babble of God and 
immortality, progress and humanity—what sense can we make of our lives?15 
This Article will form a tentative response to the question of how we might 
envision a world devoid of an epistemological gravitational center, one 
 
 10. See KAREN BARAD, MEETING THE UNIVERSE HALFWAY 106–15 (2007). 
 11. RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, 
HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS 8 (1983). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 48–49. 
 15. JOHN GRAY, STRAW DOGS: THOUGHTS ON HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS 37–38 
(2002). 
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normally occupied either by a deity or the image of a perfectible human race.  
This Article takes the position that Enlightenment humanism did, indeed, 
incorporate within its “unacknowledged assumptions and metaphors” certain 
Judeo-Christian beliefs which, in turn, found their way into our philosophy of 
law.  But this Article will also argue in favor of thinking of these beliefs not as 
a permanent armature on which the structural integrity of Western philosophy 
depends (as does Gray), but rather as a temporary scaffolding meant to support 
this epistemological edifice until such time as its ontological products 
precluded the need for such support.  More specifically, this Article will argue 
that the technoscience which has emerged out of the Objectivist/Relativist 
debates—lasting hundreds of years—is beginning to reveal that these 
purported rivals actually share the same metaphysical substrate, a grounding in 
what appears to be an increasingly anachronistic faith in the viability of 
transcendental Reason and hyper-individualism as embodied in the humanist 
tradition.  But additionally, it appears as though the new digital economy, 
through the use of simulation and mathematical modeling, is making it 
possible for us to visualize forms of truth, beauty, and justice inspired by 
neither Objectivist nor Relativist logics. 
This unlikely feat is not to be accomplished by moving forward, as the 
progress narrative of modernism would have it, but rather by going back to 
revisit the metaphorical well of geometry that guided the thoughts of 
philosophers and metaphysicians who helped shape our current material-
discursive reality.  Much has changed since philosophers routinely looked to 
geometry for guidance in matters of moral and ethical thought.  The geometry 
of Plato, Euclid, Galileo, and Hobbes has, in the interim, become the 
geometries of Riemann, Poincaré, Minkowski, and Mandelbrot.  The system of 
logical proofs presented in the Elements16 and studied for the last twenty-four 
centuries has, in only the last two of these centuries, spawned multiple 
alternative systems.  Some of these are devoted to the study of mathematical 
objects once deemed too “monstrous” and “pathological” for contemplation,17 
while others have made possible radically new understandings of space and 
time that differ as much from those held by Enlightenment philosophers as did 
the geocentric from the heliocentric view of the cosmos as held by medieval 
theologians.  Concepts of agency, linear causality, objectivity, and reductive 
logics begin to look like metaphysical abstractions in light of the new 
geometries and the new physics they make possible.  If, indeed, these 
concepts—fundamental to the American understanding of justice—continue to 
 
 16. See EUCLID, EUCLID’S ELEMENTS, at v (Isaac Todhunter ed., J.M. Dent & Sons 1961) 
(1933) (stating that Euclid’s Elements is the greatest mathematical textbook written in twenty-two 
centuries). 
 17. See BENOIT B. MANDELBROT, THE FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF NATURE 197 (1982) 
(explaining that certain fractal attractors were often described as strange). 
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mutate at the rate seen in the last two hundred years, it would seem unlikely 
that our system of jurisprudence would be able to thrive in its current form, 
even when allowing for the great plasticity it has demonstrated thus far.  It 
might be time to consider Hobbes’s advice anew and more fully begin to 
incorporate the principles instantiated in some of the new geometries into our 
moral science. 
Moving “forward,” however metaphorically, sometimes requires going 
back to get a running start, or what the French describe as reculer pour mieux 
sauter.  Nature herself employs such a strategy, known as neoteny, when she 
“leaps over” the mature forms of certain species and takes the juvenile as the 
starting point for a new evolutionary experiment, as when the free-floating 
larval stage of the sea cucumber evolved into the first species of fish rather 
than live out a sedentary existence on the ocean floor.18  Rather than try to 
invent a new form of jurisprudence from scratch, one which better reflects the 
logics of the new geometry, we will employ our own version of nature’s 
neotenic strategy.  We will review the law’s evolutionary path to determine if 
there is evidence for the existence of a potential alternate route, one that 
anticipated the logics of today’s geometries/physics and so necessarily avoided 
the philosophical errors of both the Objectivist and Relativist perspectives, but 
which was not taken at the time due to unfavorable environmental conditions.  
We begin this investigation with a brief overview of the origins of these 
dueling perspectives in Ancient Greek philosophy and then quickly move on to 
examine the iconoclastic views of early Enlightenment philosophers Spinoza 
and Leibniz.  By combining into a single conjecture their unique contributions 
to the discipline, I believe we will find a possible point of departure for our 
post-humanist itinerary.  The remainder of the Article is devoted to exploring 
what the implications of this post-humanist philosophy might be for our system 
of jurisprudence through an analysis of a contemporary legal controversy. 
Three principles from Greek philosophy are germane to the argument 
being made here: the atomic theory of Democritus,19 the quasi-dualist 
cosmogony of Plato,20 and the scala natura of Aristotle.21  These three 
constructs found their way into the foundations of Enlightenment philosophy 
and from there into our own philosophy of law. 
 
 18. See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, ONTOGENY AND PHYLOGENY 179 (1977) (describing such 
retention of larval features as neoteny).  Gould argues that humans may also have evolved via a 
neotenic process.  Id. at 361.  In support of this argument, he quotes biologist, Louis Bolk: “If I 
wished to express the basic principle of my ideas in a somewhat strongly worded sentence, I 
would say that man, in his bodily development, is a primate fetus that has become sexually 
mature.”  Id. 
 19. ANDREW G. VAN MELSEN, FROM ATOMOS TO ATOM: THE HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT 
ATOM 17 (1960). 
 20. BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 143–48 (1972). 
 21. SIR DAVID ROSS & JOHN L. ACKRILL, ARISTOTLE 118–22 (1995). 
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Fig. 1 The Sphere (Atom) 
Democritus’ atomic theory was an attempt to give a strictly materialist account 
of both physical and spiritual reality.22  Everything was thought to consist of 
small, indivisible units.23  Infinite in number and variable in shape, size, and 
temperature, the units were indestructible and forever in motion within an 
indefinite void.24  Though prescient, this theory held little sway with other 
natural philosophers until the seventeenth century when a strictly mechanical 
version of it was embraced by, among others, René Descartes and alchemist 
Robert Boyle.25  While not particularly useful scientifically until the nineteenth 
century, the idea of “social atoms” was used quite liberally by political 
philosophers such as Hobbes and Locke to describe their concept of essentially 
equal, rational, self-contained individuals.26  After being given a moral 
dimension by Kant and others, it made its way into American jurisprudence.27  
“Ethical atomism combined with Hobbes’s and Locke’s social atomism [to] 
suppl[y] some of the most important and characteristic features of American 
political theory, and the imprint of these ideas is evident and fixed in the 
Constitution.”28 
The origins of our arguably dualist system of jurisprudence are, 
meanwhile, supposedly found in Plato’s cosmogony, the Timaeus, where he 
describes an all-good demiurge bringing forth from a preexisting chaos the 
 
 22. RUSSELL, supra note 20, at 72. 
 23. Id. at 65. 
 24. Id. at 2. 
 25. Robert Kargon & Walter Charleton, Robert Boyle, and the Acceptance of Epicurean 
Atonism in England, 66 ISIS 184, 187–88 (1964). 
 26. For a critique of this philosophical construct, see MARILYN FRIEDMAN, WHAT ARE 
FRIENDS FOR? FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND MORAL THEORY 
234–35 (1993) (“This self—atomistic, presocial, empty of all metaphysical content except 
abstract reason and will—is allegedly able to stand back from all the contingent moral 
commitments and norms of its particular historical context and assess each of them in the light of 
impartial and universal criteria of reason.”). 
 27. See Elizabeth H. Wolgast, A World of Social Atoms, in APPLIED SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 226, 228 (Elizabeth Smith & H. Gene Blocker eds., 1994) (explaining that the 
atomism developed by Kant, Hume, Shaftesbury, and Reid inform Americans’ discussions and 
actions regarding social problems). 
 28. Id. 
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geometrical forms from which the cosmos will be constructed.29  Plato divides 
the soul of this cosmos into two levels, the Same and the Different, or the 
sphere of the ever uniform and the sphere of becoming.30  From these are 
derived the “Forms,” which, in turn, give rise to the sensible things: “a first 
principle, taking an increment (line) passes into its second transformation 
(plane) and from this to the next (solid), by three transformations having made 
perceptibility available to percipients . . . .”31  “Thus, it seems that Plato had in 
mind a sort of procession from the two ultimate principles to ideal numbers, 
and thence to lines and plane and stereometrical figures . . . .”32  But Plato’s 
“Timaeus, when read literally, revealed, like the doctrine of the Jews, a once-
for-all act of creation by a divine craftsman according to a definite plan.”33  
Thus, although this final dialogue of Plato makes it clear that he envisaged a 
world generated by two coeval principles, this and his other works were later 
given a monotheistic cast by various groups including the Neoplatonists. 
Plotinus, the third-century founder of the latter religio-mystical school of 
philosophy,34 would attribute to Plato in his Enneads, a Neoplatonist text 
aimed at reconciling certain aspects of Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophies, the 
concept of a totally transcendent “One.”35  Also included was a version of 
Aristotle’s concept of the scala natura, a taxonomic model by which ‘animals’ 
and, later, souls might be arranged in a linear order of perfection “according to 
the degree to which they are infected with [mere] potentiality.”36  Combining 
these two elements—Aristotle’s scalar hierarchy and a dualist interpretation of 
Plato’s cosmogony (along with Plato’s principle of plenitude or the necessary 
generation of every possible Idea and being), Neoplatonists constructed the 
“Great Chain of Being,” a continuous and complete extension of ranked kinds, 
separated only by infinitesimal degrees of gradation on a static ladder of 
Perfection.37  It was only left to the Scholastics to articulate these concepts 
within an ecclesiastical framework for us to arrive at the contours of the 
worldview shared by most, if not all, Enlightenment thinkers that: 
 
 29. Plato, Timaeus, in PLATO: THE COMPLETE WORKS 1224, 1234–35 (John M. Cooper ed., 
1997). 
 30. Id. at 1239. 
 31. JOHN D. TURNER, SETHIAN GNOSTICISM AND THE PLATONIC TRADITION 325 (2001); 
Plato, Law X (894A), in PLATO: THE COMPLETE WORKS, supra note 29, at 1318, 1550. 
 32. TURNER, supra note 31, at 325. 
 33. Id. at 347. 
 34. John R. Kroger, The Philosophical Foundations of Roman Law: Aristotle, The Stoics, 
and Roman Theories of Natural Law, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 905, 914 n.39 (2004). 
 35. Plotinus, The Fifth Ennead, in PLOTINUS: THE ENNEADS 347, 382 (Stephen MacKenna 
trans., 1991). 
 36. ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY, THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF AN 
IDEA 58–59 (Harper Torchbooks 1960) (1936) (citations omitted). 
 37. Id. at 59. 
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[T]he conception of the plan and structure of the world which, through the 
Middles Ages and down to the late eighteenth century . . . most educated men, 
were to accept without question—the conception of the universe as a “Great 
Chain of Being,” composed of an immense, or . . . infinite, number of links 
ranging in hierarchical order from the meagerest kind of existents . . . through 
“every possible” grade up to the ens perfectissimum.38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 The Pyramid (Hierarchy.) 
Given the longevity of the great chain construct (roughly fifteen hundred 
years) and the breadth of its epistemo-ontological reach, it would seem odd if 
its influence ended abruptly in response to the rise in popularity of the 
rationalist approach that was to supplant it.  And, indeed, one might reasonably 
argue that its basic framework was not so much summarily discarded in favor 
of the scientific model as appropriated by the incoming rationalists.  Great 
chain concepts such as linear causality, a transcendent Prime Mover, and a 
hierarchy of being track fairly closely with certain of modern science’s 
epistemological constructs.  It is, for example, a relatively short jump from the 
Aristotelian notion of an “unmoved mover” and “initial cause” to science’s 
concept of “force” (whatever can cause an object with mass to accelerate).39  
We also find science contrasting this “active force” with a “passive matter,” or 
that substance on which force works through top-down, linear causal chains.40  
This view of matter as passive, together with the formal structure of the great 
chain’s static, perfection hierarchy, closely mirrors modern science’s tendency 
to classify entities according to an ill-defined complexity hierarchy.  Where the 
great chain used criteria such as the capacity for self-movement or reflection to 
rank entities on its scale of “being,”41 modern science often uses a similarly 
less-than-rigorous analysis of an entity’s “complexity” (for example, 
intellectual, computational, morphological, or genomic) to impute varying 
degrees, or withhold designations of “sentience” or “intelligence.” Thus, the 
objects of study in physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, etc., increase in 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. This is comparable to the Scholastic understanding of the “‘Will of God’ which 
everywhere acts directly, without any intermediate intelligent agents!”  Origins of Scientific 
Materialism, 28 THEOSOPHY 543, 546 (1940). 
 40. See LOVEJOY, supra note 36, at 282 (discussing the active force inherent in matter). 
 41. Id. at 90. 
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complexity and unpredictability as they approach the level of the adult human.  
In effect, agency—or lack thereof—is still correlated with an entity’s ability to 
demonstrate consciousness or self-locomotion, with adult humans’ own 
presumed superior capacities for these phenomena setting the standard against 
which all others are measured.  Thus the shift from a Christian to a scientific 
version of the great chain schema did not so much eradicate its tacit 
teleological modus operandi as redirect it towards the perfectibility, not of the 
soul, but of the species.42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 The Cube (Rational Man) 
Early-Enlightenment scholars Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, all avowed 
rationalists, were heavily influenced by this metaphysical schema and its 
underlying geometrical ontology.43  This convergence of the 
metaphysical/theological tradition with the new scientific perspective 
generated a particularly creative intellectual turbulence, a metaphorical, 
epistemological rapids in an otherwise laminar flow as evidenced by the highly 
original philosophical contributions of each.44  Descartes has famously been 
credited with setting the Western world on a dualist path, establishing a radical 
separation between mind and body in an attempt to rationally ground proof of 
his existence in his ability to conceptualize his own doubt.45  The great chain of 
being could never provide such an existential certainty, as the ground of its 
being remained inexplicable, determinate upon the actions of the “unmoved 
mover” at the top of the hierarchy.46  Descartes’ argument for the existence of 
God and, by extension, his cogito, would similarly require he attempt to 
ground his proof in what amounted to a circular argument (put forward in his 
third and fourth Meditations).47  That his theory of an absolute interiority and 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. LOVEJOY, supra note 36, at 188. 
 44. We should perhaps not find this too surprising for, as Hegel noted, “Dichotomy is the 
source of the need of philosophy.”  See G.W. F. HEGEL, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FICHTE’S 
AND SCHELLING’S SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 89 (H.S Harris & Walter Cerf trans., 1977). 
 45. RUSSELL, supra note 20, at 561 (explaining Descartes’ belief in an interactive, but 
separate mind and body). 
 46. See LOVEJOY, supra note 36, at 144 (explaining the hierarchy of being from God to 
lower forms). 
 47. RENE DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY: WITH SELECTIONS FROM THE 
OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES, 24–43 (John Cottingham ed. & trans., 1996).  There is much debate on 
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absolute exteriority ultimately required grounding in a transcendent God was 
not lost on other philosophers. 
Among these philosophers was Spinoza, who ultimately rejected 
Descartes’ dualist argument in his posthumously published, five-part magnum 
opus, Ethics.48  Modeled after Euclid’s Elements,49 it argued for the existence 
of a single “substance” out of which both mind and body precipitate.50  Instead 
of a cosmos where God, Prime Mover or “mind” stands outside of and directs 
or initiates action, Spinoza posited a “neutral” or “priority” monism.51  In his 
cosmogony, “God is the created world—‘Deus, seu Natura . . . una, eademque 
est’” or “‘God, or Nature . . . are one and the same’—‘and not some creator or 
first cause preceding its effect, the created world.’” 52  He was well aware that 
“causes and effects” necessarily evokes the concept of a prime mover or “first 
cause” through “‘infinite regress’ . . . [and that f]ar from explaining anything 
about the world, knowledge invariably proved that something entirely different 
than the world (God) necessarily exists.”53 
Spinoza showed that, paradoxically, secular reason can extricate itself from the 
circular reasoning of the Cartesian type only by acknowledging its 
circularity—in this case, the fact that the presumed ground of its truth (God) is 
arbitrarily posited by itself. . . . Secular thought is one that accepts that “truth is 
the standard both of itself and of the false.54 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Klein Bottle (Spacetime Manifold) 
For Spinoza, not only is there no first cause or Prime Mover, and therefore no 
determinate causal structure, but attempts to prove the existence of such a 
 
whether Descartes’ argument is truly circular.  See, e.g., Michael Della Rocca, Descartes, The 
Cartesian Circle, and Epistemology Without God, 70 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 1, 
(2005) (defending the view that Descartes’s work is not circular because he viewed us as having a 
normative certainty of ideas while we perceive them).  I will focus here on Spinoza’s 
interpretation. 
 48. STUART HAMPSHIRE, SPINOZA AND SPINOZISM 80–84 (2005) (discussing Spinoza’s 
objection to Descartes’ circular argument). 
 49. See EUCLID, supra note 16, at 1–7 (showing Spinoza prefaced his text with 43 
definitions, axioms, and postulates, followed by 259 propositions, each with its own proof). 
 50. See HAMPSHIRE, supra note 48, at 84. 
 51. See Jonathon Schaffer, Monism: The Priority of the Whole, 119 PHIL. REV. 31, 36, 65–67 
(2010), available at http://philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/119/1/31. 
 52. A. KIARINA KORDELA, $URPLUS: SPINOZA, LACAN 30 (2007); see also SPINOZA, ETHICS 
226–27 (G.H.R. Parkinson ed., 2000) (describing God and Nature as one and the same). 
 53. KORDELA, supra note 52, at 31. 
 54. Id. at 32 (citation omitted). 
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transcendent Being through the attainment and deployment of rational 
knowledge are doomed to result in logics of the circular type.55  Both good and 
evil, truth and falsity, are necessary to complete and perfect the world, but 
neither dyad exists in any absolute sense, being purely relative to the 
experience of a given individual.  No Archimedean point exists, from neither 
outside nor from inside the system, from which to judiciously weigh the 
situation or leverage knowledge of the Truth, and there is no free will but only 
a better or worse understanding of why one behaves as one does.  The only 
thing that can be altered about the world is one’s approach to it.  Through 
gaining an understanding of one’s emotions and affections (or one’s internal 
environment), one might hope to become the adequate cause of one’s own 
effects.  Thus, Spinoza’s God is both radically immanent and radically 
reflexive.  One acquires knowledge of God through greater knowledge of 
oneself and in this way brings into alignment one’s internal and external 
environments or betters the fit between oneself and the world, with the lines 
between the two being uncertainly drawn. 
Spinoza offended Christians and Jews alike with these unorthodox views, 
including Leibniz, a pious Lutheran, who believed in a transcendent God but 
who constructed a pluralist cosmology which would ultimately come to serve 
as the foundations for a comprehensive theory of immanence.56  Leibniz 
believed the cosmos reducible neither to “mind and body” nor to “substance,” 
but required explanation through a plurality of substances which he termed 
“monads”—unique, indivisible, timeless unities of matter and soul which 
coalesce in greater or fewer numbers to form the ground of all being.57  Each 
monad is a microcosm of the larger universe.  But, as with a shattered 
holographic plate where each progressively smaller shard reflects an image of 
the whole only with diminished resolution, so monads, like fractured bits of the 
Unity they reflect, “all reach confusedly to infinity, to everything; but they are 
limited and differentiated by their level of distinct perception.”58  The level of 
perception attained by each is determined by or reflected in its proximity to the 
Creator, its resolution dropping off in relation to the quality of its soul, that is, 
rational, sensitive, or nutritive.59  Where monads’ perceptions necessarily 
distort and limit knowledge of the whole, the impingement of each monad’s 
movement on that of every other, a “communication [which] extends 
 
 55. Id. at 30–32. 
 56. See G.W. LEIBNIZ, PHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS 273–74 (Richard Francks & R.S. Woolhouse 
eds. & trans., 1998) (stating that God is a supreme substance incapable of limits and is 
distinguished from other created things by being absolutely and infinitely perfect). 
 57. Id. at 268–69. 
 58. Id. at 276. 
 59. See id. at 275. 
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indefinitely” instills in each a proprioceptive sense of the universe’s 
interconnectedness.60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 Mandelbrot Set (Fractal Geometry) 
While Leibniz’s “monadology” clearly exhibits scholastic influences in its 
establishment of a perfection hierarchy, it also includes elements drawn from 
the then-nascent rational discourse.61  We can see, for example, the influence 
of Leeweuhoek’s then-recent discovery of microorganisms in Leibniz’s vision 
of the formal structure of the universe: 
Every portion of matter can be thought of as a garden full of plants, or as a 
pond full of fish.  But every branch of the plant, every part of the animal, and 
every drop of its vital fluids, is another such garden, or another such pond. . . . 
[T]here is no uncultivated ground in the universe; nothing barren, nothing 
dead.62 
Where this image conforms to the dictates of the great chain (in that it 
disallows the possibility of a gap), this image also differs from the great chain 
in envisioning the universe to be a system of interpenetrating nested realms, of 
worlds within worlds.  Leibniz’s monadological system as a whole adds a new 
dynamism and dimensionality to the great chain’s otherwise static, planar 
schema, which allowed for bodies to exist only above, below, or alongside 
each other.63  We are now in a position to summarize the insights of Spinoza 
and Leibniz and assess whether they might indeed represent a point of 
departure for the constitution of a post-Enlightenment jurisprudence.  In other 
 
 60. Id. at 276. 
 61. LEIBNIZ, supra note 56, at 277–78. 
 62. Id. at 277. 
 63. See Casey Alt, The Materialities of Maya: Making Sense of Object-Orientation, 10 
CONFIGURATIONS 387, 415–16 (2002) (explaining that Leibniz calculated object movement 
integrally by referencing the movement of other objects thereby not requiring an absolute time-
space referent).  We see elements of this vision in his mathematical formulations as well.  His 
version of calculus differs significantly from Newton’s in that, rather than calculate the vectorial 
movement of objects derivatively from a fixed point of reference, it calculates such movement 
integrally.  That is, it is calculated relative to other objects in the modeled system (meaning that, 
like Einstein’s concept of spacetime, it describes “a network of distributed force relationships 
among various objects”).  Id. at 416.  As such, Leibniz’s integral calculus requires no external 
time-space referent and might thus be considered “to describe an affective space,” while 
Newton’s derivative version “describes an effective space.”  Id. at 415. 
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words, do they help us envision alternatives to dualist/humanist systems of 
thought that lead inevitably into unproductive Objectivist/Relativist, 
formalist/realist debates? 
The answer would appear to be yes, in that both men managed to 
invent/intuit a logically consistent, geometrized cosmos that was both non-
dualistic and yet deeply ethical, one which, in other words, had no need for the 
hypothesis of a transcendent God, because it was able to ground itself in the 
process of its own becoming.64  This is not to say that their two versions of this 
cosmos were identical, or that either of them claimed to have, or had even 
sought to create, a cosmogony that undermined faith in the one, true God.  
Rather, while Spinoza seems to have been, for the most part, indifferent to 
such characterizations of his philosophy, Leibniz believed that his cosmology 
(his theory of monads) offered proof for the existence of a transcendent God.65  
Today, however, his monadology and some of the theories contained within his 
version of “the calculus” instead provide the first comprehensive foundation 
for the concept of immanence.66  And their positions on such fundamental 
issues as causality, agency, and the existence of good and evil were widely 
divergent.67 
But their views were complimentary in other ways.  Where Spinoza 
anticipated the development of topology by some two hundred years in his 
vision of the universe as a self-enfolding, dynamic manifold throughout which 
agency was uniformly distributed,68 Leibniz articulated a scale-invariant world 
of self-similar, nested entities each of which reflected the other and the whole 
of which they were a part.69  Neither of these theories met much support during 
their authors’ lifetimes, but the past century’s technoscientific advances have 
 
 64. See W.W. ROUSE BALL, A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS 418 
(1960) (referring to Laplace’s famous reply to Napoleon when asked why he hadn’t mentioned 
God in his tome on the system of the universe—“‘Je n’avais pas besoin de cette hypothèse-là.’”). 
 65. LEIBNIZ, supra note 56, at 273. 
 66. See id. at 221 (discussing Leibniz’s famous “Maxima-Minima Principle”—the idea that 
every point in the universe, no matter how small, contains a replica of the universe within itself, 
and thus of God); see also CARL B. BOYER, A HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS 404 (2d ed. 1991) 
(stating that Leibniz was not deterred by uncertainty which led to a readier acceptance of 
differentials). 
 67. Leibniz strenuously objected to Spinoza’s relative, rather than absolute, characterization 
of the good as being “that which we certainly know to be useful to us” and evil as “that which we 
certainly know to be an obstacle to our attainment of some good.”  PAULINE PHEMISTER, THE 
RATIONALISTS: DESCARTES, SPINOZA, AND LEIBNIZ 79–81 (2006). 
 68. See KORDELA, supra note 52, at 30 (discussing Spinoza’s argument that to know a 
substance is to expose it as the cause of its own properties). 
 69. See LEIBNIZ, supra note 56, at 275 (discussing the interconnectedness of created things 
and explaining that simple substances have relationships with one another creating a mirror image 
of the universe). 
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made their relevance for the present day, including for our philosophy of law, 
inescapable.70 
That we are beginning to understand the potential practical use of these 
ideas is reflected in, or due to,71 at least in part, the new geometries developed 
around the turn of the last century.  Topology, which deals with qualitative 
descriptions of connections and boundaries (Möbius strip or Klein bottle, for 
example) as opposed to the more familiar Euclidean or Riemannian 
quantitative analyses of shape and size, was one of these new gemoetries.72  Its 
development, attributed in large part to Henri Poincaré, proved critical to the 
generation of the special theory of relativity in 1905 as well as the related 
concept of the spacetime manifold and might thus be viewed as the catalyst for 
one of the most profound epistemic and ontological upheavals since the 
Copernican revolution.73  The philosophical implications of this upheaval are 
beginning to be explored in earnest today, due in part to our newfound 
technical ability to investigate the topology of the manifold in conjunction with 
the principal of indeterminacy as articulated by physicist Niels Bohr.74  
Together these developments not only contest the Newtonian idea of space as 
container and time as exterior parameter but force us to reopen debates about 
cause and effect, subject/object relations and autonomous agency that had been 
settled since the ascendency of the rational worldview.75  Much of this Article, 
then, is devoted to tracing this on-going shift, prefigured in the philosophies of 
Spinoza and Leibniz, from a geometrical to a topological understanding of our 
world and selves, or, as cognitive scientist Francisco Varela described it, to 
realizing we “are beings not simply in time, but of time”.76 
Spinoza’s conception of a monistic universe, for example, is beginning to 
look prescient as experiments at the quantum level reveal the inherent 
 
 70. Spinoza famously received a sort of “excommunication” from the Jewish community in 
Amsterdam for his heretical and “monstrous actions.”  PHEMISTER, supra note 67, at 8. 
 71. The distinction between these terms is in doubt as a result of the adoption of the causal 
models being discussed. 
 72. See Nicholas V. Swindale, Visual Cortex: Looking into a Klein Bottle, 6 CURRENT BIO. 
776, 776 (1996) (discussing the Klein Bottle and Topology); David M. Walba et al., Total 
Synthesis of the First Molecular Möbius Strip, 104 J. AM. CHEM. SOC. 3219, 3219 (1982) 
(discussing the Möbius Strip and topology). 
 73. K.S. Sarkaria, The Topological Work of Henri Poincare, in HISTORY OF TOPOLOGY 123, 
123 (Ion Mackenzie James ed., 1999). 
 74. John Polkinghorne, Space, Time, and Casualty, 41 J. RELIGION & SCI. 975, 979 (2006). 
 75. Id. at 976 (“The Newtonian concept of space as the container in which isolated atoms are 
free to rattle around . . . has been replaced in modern physics by the altogether more integrated 
and relational picture of the interconnection between spacetime and matter that is offered by 
general relativity.”). 
 76. See MARK B. N. HANSEN, NEW PHILOSOPHY FOR NEW MEDIA 250 (2004). 
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connectivity of all matter.77  Niels Bohr was the first to “prove”78 that the dual 
particle/wave nature of light and matter was true not just epistemologically, as 
Heisenberg had argued, but ontologically as well.79  That this pointed towards 
the interconnected and fundamentally indeterminate nature of reality, he 
argued, “necessit[ated] . . . a final renunciation of the classical ideal of 
causality and a radical revision of our attitude towards the problem of physical 
reality.”80  As physicist Toraldo di Francia more recently explained, “Since any 
particle has certainly interacted with other particles in the past, the world turns 
out to be nonseparable into individual and independent objects.  The world is 
in some way a single object.”81 
Meanwhile, complexity and chaos theory, which were anticipated in 
Leibniz’s integral calculus and monadology, have demonstrated that an 
analytics of determinacy, linear causality, and reductionism is useful in only a 
prescribed area of investigation.82  They show, for example, that small causes 
need not have small effects, as was true in the classical model, because “tiny 
initial changes [even at the quantum level] can quickly be magnified and 
brought up to macroscopic expression.”83  Thus complete determinacy, even at 
the macro level, is impossible, as it would require perfect knowledge of a given 
system, something not just epistemologically but ontologically unattainable, as 
Bohr demonstrated.84  They show that the reverse is also true, however, in that 
seemingly chaotic systems often display a deeply ordered structure, a 
discovery made only recently through the use of mathematical modeling and 
 
 77. See Giuliano Toraldo di Francia, A World of Individual Objects?, in INTERPRETING 
BODIES:  CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM OBJECTS IN MODERN PHYSICS 21, 28 (Elena Castellani ed., 
1998) (“Two particles, having interacted in the past, form an inseparable whole, even if at present 
they are far apart.”). 
 78. See BARAD, supra note 10, at 106–15 (Bohr’s proof was part of a gedanken, or thought 
experiment, which “demonstrated” the ontological impossibility of simultaneous determination 
and position and momentum). 
 79. See Polkinghorne, supra note 74, at 979 (noting how Bohr interpreted Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle of quantum theory as an “ontological principle of indeterminism and not 
merely an epistemological principle of ignorance”). 
 80. BARAD, supra note 10, at 126. 
 81. di Francia, supra note 77, at 21, 28. 
 82. See Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Darwinism, Causality and the Social Sciences, 11 J. ECON. 
METHODOLOGY 175, 186 (2004) (highlighting the analytical and computational limits of 
determinacy in light of complexity and chaos theories). 
 83. N. KATHERINE HAYLES, CHAOS BOUND: ORDERLY DISORDER IN CONTEMPORARY 
LITERATURE AND SCIENCE 212 (1990). 
 84. See Walter M. Elsasser, Quantum Mechanics, Amplifying Processes, and Living Mater, 
18 PHIL. SCI. 300, 307 (1951) (highlighting Bohr’s conclusion that operation of the vital functions 
of an organism precludes knowledge of the microscopic variables that determine its macroscopic 
behavior). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1232 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:1217 
computer simulation.85  While Descartes’ dualist philosophy, or that which 
undergirds the Objectivist/Relativist debates in our own era, has reached its 
apotheosis in the zeroes and ones of the digital economy, it has also, ironically, 
provided the tools for its own undoing—it has given us the means by which we 
might foreground the analog visions of Spinoza and Leibniz, or those 
topological logics which shift our focus from “the individual unit to [the] 
recursive symmetries between scal[ar] levels.”86 
Both men operated under the assumption that any attempt to gain 
knowledge of our interior and/or exterior reality required the aid of 
geometrizing logics.  All other (Western) epistemological or ontological 
endeavors necessarily unfold from the understandings of time, space, 
extension, and causality they serve to systematize.87  The philosophy of the 
Enlightenment era, which continues to dominate our cultural imaginary and 
 
 85. Interestingly, Benoit Mandelbrot, the inventor of fractal geometry, a geometrical system 
used to model turbulence and other chaotic or complex systems, was inspired by Leibniz’s 
investigations into self-similarity. 
My Leibniz mania is further reinforced by finding that for one moment its hero attached 
importance to geometric scaling.  In ‘Euclidis Prota’, which is an attempt to tighten 
Euclid’s axioms, he states, ‘I have diverse definitions for the straight line.  The straight 
line is a curve, any part of which is similar to the whole, and it alone has this property, not 
only among curves but among sets.’  This claim can be proved today. 
MANDELBROT, supra note 17, at 419 (citations omitted). 
As Mandelbrot writes: 
Is it not a pity that Leibniz (1646–1716) missed these developments!  Yet, actually, he 
came close.  While a Newton could be satisfied with defining derivatives and integrals, 
and then iterating these operations using an integer index, for a Leibniz they are but a first 
step.  Immediately he thinks of making the order of integer differentiation into a fraction. 
Benoit Mandelbrot, Two Heirs to the Great Chain of Being 3 (circa 1982) (unpublished article), 
available at http://math.yale.edu/mandelbrot/web_docs/greatChain.doc. 
  Had Leibniz had access to computers, he might well have been able to demonstrate the 
viability of his own and Spinoza’s vision of an interconnected, fractal cosmos, as physicists and 
geometers are now doing.  Jan Ambjorn, Jerzy Jurkiewicz & Renate Loll, The Self-Organizing 
Quantum Universe, 299 SCI. AM. 42, 44 (2008) (describing a new theory of quantum gravity, 
called triangular dynamical triangulation, which supposes that spacetime takes on a fractal shape). 
Causal dynamical triangulation . . . is an approach to quantum gravity that like loop 
quantum gravity is background independent.  This means that it does not assume any pre-
existing arena (dimensional space), but rather attempts to show how the spacetime fabric 
itself evolves. . . . At large scales, it re-creates the familiar 4-dimensional spacetime, but it 
shows spacetime to be 2-d near the Planck scale, and reveals a fractal structure on slices 
of constant time. 
HAYLES, supra note 83, at 13 (emphasis omitted). 
 86. HAYLES, supra note 83, at 13. 
 87. Jerry R. Hobbs et al., Commonsense Metaphysics and Lexical Semantics, 13 
COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 241, 241 (1987) (noting how granularity, scales, time, space, 
material, physical objects, shape, causality, functionality, and force “figure in virtually every 
domain of discourse”). 
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system of jurisprudence, is still very much influenced by Euclidian 
understandings of these constructs.  We might do well then to begin to more 
aggressively incorporate into our political and legal philosophies some of the 
new understandings of these fundamental concepts as revealed by fractal 
geometry, topology, and quantum theory. 
The Enlightenment era, broadly understood, is bookended by the 
Copernican revolution on one side and relativity/quantum theory on the 
other.88  From beginning to end the Enlightenment era tells the tale of the 
decentering of the human—spatially, by the heliocentric worldview which 
displaced humans from the center of the physical universe; temporally, by 
Darwin’s theory of evolution, which posited time as having begun long before 
human’s arrival; psychically, by Freud’s theory of the unconscious, which 
challenged the concept of the rational agent; and finally, physically, as 
technoscience begins to make tangible the effects of Einstein’s equating of 
matter and energy and Bohr’s revelation of the inseparability of knower and 
known.89  The philosophical contributions of Spinoza and Leibniz should be 
viewed in this context and understood as contributing to this general thrust 
because they challenge the long-held notions of human agency, perhaps the 
last bastion of an anthropocentric metaphysics.  Recently renewed interest in 
their seventeenth century fractal/topological cosmology suggests that this site 
marks an inflection point in the spatiotemporal order, a site of rupture from 
which a new post-humanist philosophy might depart.90  It becomes clearer as 
we move away in time that, by evacuating agency and presence from the 
dualist, Cartesian worldview, Spinoza, and Leibniz managed to foreground the 
usually invisible field of relations out of which these arise.91 
Today, our technogenesis, or the co-evolution of technology and the 
human, is pushing our Enlightenment-inflected concept of agency to the 
 
 88. See Fernando L. Canale, Revelation and Inspiration: The Liberal Mode, 32 ANDREWS U. 
SEMINARY STUD. 169, 170–71 (1994) (discussing how philosophical trends during the 
Enlightenment period, including Kant’s Copernican revolution, reinterpreted reason “by limiting 
its reach to the space-time continuum”). 
 89. See Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Theology and the Condition of Postmodernity: A Report on 
Knowledge (of God), in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO POSTMODERN THEOLOGY 3, 14 (Kevin 
J. Vanhoozer ed., 2003) (concluding that the postmodern variation of the Copernican revolution 
resulted in further de-centering of the human subject). 
 90. See MATTHEW STEWART, THE COURTIER AND THE HERETIC: LEIBNIZ, SPINOZA, AND 
THE FATE OF GOD IN THE MODERN WORLD 240 (2006) (“The confrontation between Leibnizian 
and Spinoxistic conceptions of divinity . . . continue[] to characterize discussions to the present, 
notably in the field of cosmology.”). 
 91. Id. at 166–67 (describing the approaches taken by Spinoza and Leibniz to solving the 
Cartesian mind-body problem). 
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breaking point.92  As technologies make the mutability of the quantum level 
more accessible, the boundaries of atoms, genes, organs, bodies, and 
organizations become more fluid, making agency increasingly difficult to 
locate.93  Advances in mathematical modeling and computer simulation made 
possible by quantum theory and topology reveal dynamic patterns common to 
both physical and social systems, undermining the notion that agency is solely 
about the potential for individual human action.94  While these models confirm 
that we are each more than the sum of our parts because we interact creatively 
with our environment, they also indicate that this does not distinguish us from 
systems existing at other scales of organization, both larger and smaller than 
our own.95  They suggest that to operate thoughtfully and ethically in the 
world, we have to discard the atomistic, Newtonian model of interaction, 
which likens individuals to billiard balls bouncing off one another, and 
embrace the topological model anticipated by Spinoza and Leibniz, which 
provides us with a way to visualize how we are connected to each other 
through our intra-actions within what theoretical physicist Karen Barad 
describes as a self-enfolding, “spacetimematter manifold.”96 
The topological model also provides us with a way to think about matter 
“as substance in its intra-active becoming—not a thing but a doing, a 
congealing of agency,”97 and about the fact that its dual expression as particle 
and wave is a reflection of our own, as determined by Bohr.98  Being 
expressions of matter ourselves we exhibit both wavelike qualities, which point 
in the direction of relationality, as well as particle or corpuscular qualities, as 
personified in the construct of the liberal human subject so central to Western 
culture.  Of course, other cultures emphasize the wavelike or relational aspect 
of existence and downplay the corpuscular, often at the expense of individual 
 
 92. See David Lewin, Freedom and Destiny in the Philosophy of Technology, 87 NEW 
BLACKFRIARS 515, 521 (2006) (“[H]uman agency must be protected from the anti-democratic 
tendencies of modern technology.”). 
 93. See id. at 519 (“Despite recent attempts to formalise the discipline of the philosophy of 
technology and to clarify precisely where agency lies, a persistent ambiguity remains.”). 
 94. See Robert Costanza et al., Modeling Complex Ecological Economic Systems, 43 
BIOSCIENCE 545, 546 (1993) (“[C]omputer and machine learning advances have spawned 
‘artificial adaptive agents,’ computer programs that can simulate evolution and acquire 
sophisticated behavioral patterns.”); Douglas T. Kenrick et al., Dynamical Evolutionary 
Psychology: Individual Decision Rules and Emergent Social Norms, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 3, 3 
(2003) (applying dynamical systems theory to evolutionary psychology); Linda B. Smith & 
Esther Thelen, Development as a Dynamic System, 7 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 343, 343 (2003) 
(applying dynamical systems theory to the self-organization of human development). 
 95. Lewin, supra note 92, at 519. 
 96. See BARAD, supra note 10, at 245 (describing the spacetimematter manifold as a process 
of connectedness involving the agential enfolding of different scales through one another). 
 97. Id. at 183–84. 
 98. Id. at 105–06. 
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agency.99  But argument about which is preferable is pointless, as the idea is to 
allow matter to express its dual particle/wave nature at whatever level of 
organization it happens to manifest, our own included.  We are both individual 
and collective, and systems which accommodate and facilitate the expression 
of this dual nature are to be desired while those which impede it are not.  
Allowed to oscillate quickly enough between expressing these dual qualities, 
we begin to lose the need to distinguish between whether it is we who are 
agentive or the world, effectively collapsing the Cartesian boundary between 
absolute interiority and absolute exteriority.  As intuited by Spinoza, we allow 
its agency to enact us by effectively evacuating our own agency from the 
world.  “Our” agency becomes splayed out over a full range of systems both 
within us and without and we discover that we no longer need to “re-present” 
the world to ourselves because we enact it and ourselves simultaneously.  
Perhaps our goal then should be to create a system of jurisprudence which 
furthers this expression, the very activity in which Spinoza and Leibniz were 
engaged. 
Certainly one thing is becoming increasingly clear—to save what we think 
of as the human and the related concept of the individual, we have to accept 
that neither of these can continue to serve as the gravitational center of our 
philosophy.  Other entities existing at other scales of organization, be they 
molecules or moons, organelles or organizations, no more rotate around the 
human than does the sun around the earth.  Agency is not ours alone but is the 
default condition of matter (or the term we use to describe the effects of the 
spacetimematter manifold coming into contact with itself).  We are all in this 
together, and the “we” is a far more inclusive category than we had ever 
imagined. 
In some respects, these ideas are already making their way into our legal 
philosophy.  In his latest book, Justice, Harvard Professor of Government 
Michael Sandel examines the moral and political philosophy that undergirds 
the American system of jurisprudence.100  Among the numerous complex legal 
decisions he mines for insights into this philosophy is an alleged case of 
reverse discrimination at the University of Texas Law School.101  Ronald 
Dworkin argues in support of the Law School’s affirmative action policy and 
stresses that the plaintiff’s rights were not violated because institutions have a 
right to define their missions as they see fit as long as they do not single out 
and treat with contempt a given individual or group.102  According to Sandel, 
 
 99. Asaf Federman, What Kind of Free Will Did the Buddha Teach?, 60 PHIL. EAST & WEST 
1, 1 (2010) (explaining how a non-western culture views matter and relationships among matter 
that limits agency). 
 100. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 30 (2009). 
 101. Id. at 167–69. 
 102. Id. at 174. 
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Dworkin’s argument seeks to sever the link between justice and moral desert 
so as to allow the law to remain neutral with respect to the fraught issues of 
honor and virtue that cases of this nature inevitably entail.103  Political 
philosopher John Rawls took a similar approach in his book, A Theory of 
Justice, by arguing that “[n]o one deserves his greater natural capacity nor 
merits a more favorable starting place in society.”104  Rather than ascribe 
superior merit or virtue to the individual for having achieved her or his 
success, Rawls suggests we should recognize that it is, in fact, the fit between 
society’s goals and the individual’s talents and qualities that determines who 
reaps the so-called “moral desert.”105  There is, then, nothing “moral” about 
one’s rewards as all of what we might think of as merit, according to Sandel’s 
interpretation of his argument, is attributable to the good or bad fortune of a 
given individual.106 
This claim runs counter to a central tenet of American jurisprudence which 
holds persons, artificial or otherwise, to be rational, autonomous agents with 
all the rights and responsibilities that attach to such entities as determined by 
law.107  Fate or chance is antithetical to this, as it undermines our 
understanding of causality or that which grounds rational thought and thus the 
law itself.  So why would Rawls want to invoke fortune, good or bad, as a 
concept to help us think through some of the thornier legal issues of our day?  
This might be because, like Sandel, he feels that “the more we regard our 
success as our own doing, the less responsibility we feel for those who fall 
behind,”108 a perspective which Sandel believes leads to the “hollowing out of 
the public realm”109 and thus to an “undermin[ing of] the solidarity that 
democratic citizenship requires.”110 
But Sandel is skeptical of Rawls’ and Dworkin’s attempts to remedy this 
and similar situations by having the law remain neutral on issues of value and 
meaning, honor and virtue, because the inseparability of these from the 
“objects” of debate is becoming increasingly apparent.111  By Dworkin’s logic, 
he argues, universities should be free to sell a percentage of their admission 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 87 (rev. ed. 1999). 
 105. See id. at 62–63 (stating that the system of distribution is strongly influenced by natural 
and social contingencies including natural abilities and talents). 
 106. See SANDEL, supra note 100, at 153–55 (explaining Rawls’s argument that the 
distribution of shares is based on morally arbitrary factors). 
 107. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272–73 (1978) (stating that a 
postulate of political morality is that human beings are capable of forming their own conceptions 
of how their lives should be lived). 
 108. SANDEL, supra note 100, at 179. 
 109. Id. at 267. 
 110. Id. at 266. 
 111. Id. at 183. 
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slots to the highest bidders, a position which ignores that “justice in allocating 
access to a university has something to do with the goods that universities 
properly pursue,” that is, “to serve the common good through teaching and 
research.”112  To arrive at a just decision in this case thus requires a debate 
about what function the university and similar institutions serve in society as a 
whole.  While this debate would most likely be contentious, he argues, it 
would reinvigorate civic life and thus enhance the common good. 
As demonstrated earlier, Sandel might be attempting to articulate a 
Spinozist/Leibnizian form of jurisprudence. In his view, achieving a just 
society requires we move beyond the Objectivist concept of “liberal 
neutrality,” which imagines there to be a position outside of the system 
(original text, discursive logics) from which the Truth might be leveraged, and 
embrace instead a “politics of moral engagement,”113 one which encourages us 
to acknowledge and debate our moral disagreements rather than try to have the 
law make these decisions for us.114  But he thus also rejects the Relativist 
argument because, in his formulation, truth does exist, though not in a form 
either Objectivists or Relativists would recognize; truth does not take a static 
Form, in the Platonic sense, but rather reveals itself as the potential for an 
open-ended, dynamic, process of debate.115 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Self-Reflexive Spiral 
The ultimate ground of truth(s), then, is located in the relationships which 
foster this potential for debate(s), relationships which, in turn, require that 
truth(s), in the form of the law, protect and sustain their viability.  The dynamic 
between the two is, of course, a reciprocal one as is the dynamic between 
individual concerns and the common good.  The space of agency encloses 
these two scales of organization and extends even further. Adjusting our 
system of jurisprudence to accommodate this new reality may take some time, 
but such adjustment is a goal well worth pursuing, and one which Leibniz and 
Spinoza would no doubt applaud. 
  
 
 112. Id. 
 113. SANDEL, supra note 100, at 268. 
 114. Id. at 268. 
 115. See id. (arguing for more public debate, which would have the potential to bring about 
the truth). 
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